Published papers

Reputation and the Flow of Information in Repeated Games
Eduardo Faingold
Econometrica, 88, Issue 4 (July 2020), 1697-1723.

Characterizing the Strategic Impact of Misspecified Beliefs
Yi-Chun Chen, Alfredo Di Tillio, Eduardo Faingold and Siyang Xiong,
The Review of Economic Studies, 84, Issue 4 (October 2017), 1424–1471.
Online Appendix.

Reputation in Continuous-Time Games
Eduardo Faingold and Yuliy Sannikov,
Econometrica, 79, Issue 3 (May 2011), 773-876.
Online appendix. Review at NAJ Economics.

Uniform Topologies on Types
Yi-Chun Chen, Alfredo Di Tillio, Eduardo Faingold and Siyang Xiong,
Theoretical Economics, 5, Issue 3 (Sep 2010), 445-478.

Working papers

Continuous-Time Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information
Eduardo Faingold and Yuliy Sannikov

Moral Hazard in Stochastic Differential Games: Beyond Markov Equilibrium
Eduardo Faingold and Yuliy Sannikov

Learning Foundations of Common Knowledge
Eduardo Faingold and Omer Tamuz

The Structure of Consistent Type Spaces
Alfredo Di Tillio, Eduardo Faingold and Dov Samet

Maintaining a Reputation in Continuous Time
Eduardo Faingold

Research in progress

The Value of a Reputation under Imperfect Monitoring
Martin W. Cripps and Eduardo Faingold