Research

Published and Forthcoming Papers


Reputation and the Flow of Information in Repeated Games
Eduardo Faingold
forthcoming at Econometrica 

 


Characterizing the Strategic Impact of Misspecified Beliefs
Yi-Chun Chen, Alfredo Di Tillio, Eduardo Faingold and Siyang Xiong,
The Review of Economic Studies, 84(4),1424–1471 (2017).
Online Appendix.

 


Reputation in Continuous-Time Games
Eduardo Faingold and Yuliy Sannikov,
Econometrica, 79(3), 773-876 (2011).
Online appendixReview at NAJ Economics.

 


Uniform Topologies on Types
Yi-Chun Chen, Alfredo Di Tillio, Eduardo Faingold and Siyang Xiong,
Theoretical Economics, 5, 445-478 (2010).

 


Working papers

Moral Hazard in Stochastic Differential Games: Beyond Markov Equilibrium
Eduardo Faingold and Yuliy Sannikov

Statistical Foundations of Common Knowledge
Alfredo Di Tillio, Eduardo Faingold, Omer Tamuz

The Structure of Priors and Common Priors
Alfredo Di Tillio, Eduardo Faingold and Dov Samet

The Value of a Reputation under Imperfect Monitoring: an Example
Martin W. Cripps and Eduardo Faingold

Bad Reputation and Limited Memory
Eduardo Faingold, Yoshifumi Hino and Yasusyuki Miyahara

Maintaining a Reputation in Continuous Time
Eduardo Faingold

Research in progress

Iterated Beliefs and Common Priors in Infinite Type Spaces
Alfredo Di Tillio, Eduardo Faingold, Dov Samet, Omer Tamuz

Discrete-Time Approximations of Continuous-Time Games with Imperfect Public Information
Eduardo Faingold and Yuliy Sannikov

Filtering and Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
Eduardo Faingold, Jonathan Hauenstein, Johannes Hörner and Yuliy Sannikov

Real Options, Moral Hazard and Limited Liability
Eduardo Faingold and Suvi Vasama